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[Abstract] 
Both the subject who gives birth to a constitution and the time a constitution 
comes into being are part of the multifarious construct of the genesis of a 
constitution. The intertwinement of the constituent power (subject) and the 
founding moment (time) not only gives rise to issues at the centre of scholarship 
on constituent power but also speaks to ambiguities about the relationship 
between the founding moment and its ensuing constitutional order in 
constitutional theory.  In this paper, I examine the question of the founding 
moment in constitutional scholarship in light of the antinomy between fact and 
norm.  I argue that contemporary constitutional theories fail to account for the 
role of the founding moment in the constitutional order because they are absorbed 
in the narrow question of constitutional interpretation at the expense of making 
sense of the constitutional order.  Drawing upon Robert Cover’s inspiring 
discussion of nomos and narratives, I contend that the founding moment is pivotal 
to the discovery of constitutional meaning as it stands as the reservoir of the 
enriching narratives about the birth and growth of a constitutional order.  
Through narratives, the founding moment is related to its ensuing constitutional 
order and thus ‘constitutionalized’, suggesting a broader understanding of 
interpretation in constitutional theory than contemporary constitutional theories 
assume.  On this view, the founding moment is neither a mere historical fact nor 
a placeholder for universal norms.  Rather, narratives about the founding 
moment concern more the invigoration of the existing constitutional order than its 
original foundation.  Thus emerges an alternative attitude towards the unsettling 
concept of constituent power: the constituent power’s appeal does not so much lie 
in the substitution of a new constitutional order for the existing one as in its 
rejuvenation of the latter since it is reincarnated in the narratives-mediated 
constitutionalized founding moment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The character and identity of a constitutional regime (or simply constitutional identity) 
is not a novel concept in constitutional theory but has seen a resurgence in recent 
scholarship.1  Such anthropomorphic references to the issues resulting from the continuity 
                                                
1 Traditionally, the key question concerning constitutional identity is whether a changing constitutional order 
should be regarded as the continuation of the original one or as the replacement that is new and distinct from it.  
Jan-Herman Reestman, ‘The Franco-German’ Constitutional Divide: Reflections on National and Constitutional 
Identity’ (2009) 5 EuConst 374, 382-84; Monika Polzin, ‘Constitutional Identity, Unconstitutional Amendments 
and the Idea of Constituent Power: The Development of the Doctrine of Constitutional Identity in German 
Constitutional Law’ (2016) 14 ICON 411.  Notably, a recent wave of literature on constitutional identity 
centres on the question of ‘identification’ and is more or less sociologically oriented.  See 412.  Under this 
view, constitutional identity appears to be a special form of national identity.  Compare Michel Rosenfeld, The 
Identity of the Constitutional Subject: Selfhood, Citizenship, Culture, and Community (Routledge 2010) 11-12 
with Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, Constitutional Identity (Harvard University Press 2010) 9-10.  For the present 
purposes, constitutional identity is understood in its traditional sense.         
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and change of constitutional orders have proliferated on both sides of the Atlantic and 
beyond over the past three decades.2  On this view, a constitution has its genesis.  Far from 
being a unitary construct, the genesis of a constitution has generated a set of topics for further 
investigation in constitutional theory.  The subject who gives birth to a constitution is one; 
the time when a constitution comes into being is another.  Both being part of the 
multifarious construct of the genesis of a constitution, the constituent power (subject) and the 
founding moment of constitutional orders (time) are intertwined.  Bringing the crucial role 
of momentous constitutional politics in understanding a constitutional order to the fore, 
Bruce Ackerman’s theory of constitutional moment is an exemplar.3  Yet, as many of his 
critics have pointed out, how the construct of constitutional moment is related to the 
constitution itself is unclear.  Is it a function of the existing constitutional order or a 
manifestation of extraconstitutional power?  Is it norm or merely fact?  Is it situated within 
or without the constitutional order?4   
Although these issues have been at the centre of scholarship on constituent power, they 
also speak to ambiguities about the relationship between the founding moment and its 
ensuing constitutional order in constitutional theory.  Yet, there is a fundamental difference 
in character that makes the question of the constitutional status of the founding moment more 
complex than the idea of constituent power.  In contrast to the idea of constituent power, the 
founding moment is more than a conceptual construct.  Rather, the founding moment of a 
constitutional order points to the series of historical events that lead to the adoption of the 
constitution.5  That difference suggests that beneath the relationship between the founding 
moment and its ensuing constitutional order are questions about the identity of constitutional 
theory itself: Is the historical founding moment relevant to the theorization of the constitution 
at all?  If so, how is the originary moment being considered in constitutional theories?  Is 
the state of the art satisfactory?  Can we rethink the question of the founding moment in 
constitutionalism beyond current theoretical positions?   
My paper takes up these issues at the core of constitutional theory by examining the 
question of the founding moment in constitutional scholarship in light of the antinomy 
between fact and norm.  I argue that contemporary constitutional theories fail to account for 
the role of the founding moment in the constitutional order because they are absorbed in the 
narrow question of constitutional interpretation at the expense of making sense of the 
constitutional order.  Drawing upon Robert Cover’s concept of nomos,6 I contend that with 
                                                
2 See eg Reestman (n 1); Polzin (n 1); Bruce Ackerman, We the People, Volume 1: Foundations (Belknap 
1991); Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time: A Theory of Constitutional Self-Government (Yale University Press 
2001); Chaihark Hahm and Sung Ho Kim, Making We the People: Democratic Constitutional Founding in 
Postwar Japan and South Korea (CUP 2015). 
3 Ackerman (n 2). 
4 See eg Andrew Arato ‘Carl Schmitt and the Revival of the Doctrine of the Constituent Power in the United 
States’ (2000) 21 Cardozo Law Review 1739. 
5 This distinguishes the Ackermanian constitutional moment from the historical founding moment of a 
constitutional order.  While both point to an extended period of time during which a constitutional order 
originates or undergoes great transformation, the former turns out to be a theory of constituent power, which is 
related to but separate from the question of the status of the founding moment in a constitutional order.           
6 Robert M Cover, ‘The Supreme Court, 1982 Term -- Foreword: Nomos and Narrative’ (1983) 97 Harv L 
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an eye to the understanding of the constitution beyond the interpretation of constitutional 
norms, the constitutional order needs to be recast as a constitutional nomos.  As a 
constitutional nomos operates not only on constitutional norms but also on the enriching 
narratives about the birth and growth of a constitutional order, the founding moment is 
pivotal to the discovery of constitutional meaning in this broad sense.  Through narratives, 
the founding moment is related to its ensuing constitutional order and thus 
‘constitutionalized’, suggesting a broader understanding of interpretation in constitutional 
theory than contemporary constitutional theories assume.  On this view, the founding 
moment is neither a mere historical fact nor a placeholder for universal norms but rather 
serves as the reference point for constitutional redemption that renders the constitutional 
order ‘jurisgenerative’. 7   Narratives about the founding moment concern more the 
invigoration of the existing constitutional order than its original foundation.  This 
observation further suggests an alternative attitude towards the unsettling concept of 
constituent power:8 the constituent power’s appeal does not so much lie in the substitution of 
a new constitutional order for the existing one as in its rejuvenation of the latter since it is 
reincarnated in the narratives-mediated constitutionalized founding moment.   
My argument proceeds as follows.  In the first place, I shall establish that two opposite 
views dominate current constitutional scholarship on the question of the founding moment.  
As I shall explain, under the historicist view, the founding moment is fact only;9 under the 
normativist view, it is absorbed into constitutional norms.  Neither is satisfactory as the 
question of the founding moment in constitutionalism is reduced to a methodological debate 
about constitutional interpretation among specialists (II).  Taking issue with this jurispathic 
rendering of the founding moment in contemporary constitutional theories, I shall continue to 
propose a relational approach to the constitutionalization of the founding moment by drawing 
upon Cover’s ideas in ‘Nomos and Narrative’.10  Situated between fact and norm and 
mediated by narratives, the founding moment conceived of this way will turn the enterprise 
of constitutional interpretation into one of nomos-building that invites revitalizing narratives 
from citizens in the discovery of the meaning of the constitutional project.  Thus, the 
narratives-mediated constitutionalization of the founding moment also entails an alternative 
account of the constituent power (III).  To conclude, I shall underline the implications of the 
relational approach to the constitutionalization of the founding moment to constitutional 
theory in terms of substance, process, and structure (IV). 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
Rev 4. 
7 For the distinction between a ‘jurisgenerative’ and a ‘jurispathic’ legal order , see ibid 40-44.  For a 
different understanding of whether a legal order is jurisgenerative, see Frank Michelman, ‘Law’s Republic’ 
(1988) Yale LJ 1493; Seyla Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism (Robert Post ed, OUP 2006) 48-50. 
8 Hahm and Kim (n 1) 35; David Dyzenhaus, ‘The Politics of the Question of Constituent Power’ in Martin 
Loughlin and Neil Walker (eds), The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional 
Form (OUP 2007) 129; Martin Loughlin, ‘The Concept of Constituent Power’ (2014) 23 European Journal of 
Political Theory 218. 
9 I use the term historicist to denote this particular attitude among historians towards historical events.   
10 Cover (n 8). 
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II. FACT OR NORM? FOUNDING MOMENTS ENVISAGED IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
As the question of the founding moment in constitutional theory concerns how to fit 
historical facts into the conceptualization of a normative order, I follow in the footsteps of 
those who have utilized the antinomy between fact and norm as the analytical framework for 
manifold legal and constitutional issues.11  Situating theories of the founding moment in 
constitutionalism in this antinomy, I begin with a discussion of historicist theories in which 
the founding moment is regarded as fact.  Unveiling the interpretive character of 
constitutional theory, I note that historicist theories oscillate between disregard and fidelity in 
their attitude towards the founding moment as a matter of fact.   Then I turn to the 
normativist strain.  In contrast to the historicist oscillation between disregard and fidelity, 
normativists effectively equate the founding moment with the original values that underlie 
constitutional provisions.  After disclosing the historicist and normativist views of the 
founding moment, I discuss why neither is satisfactory as both reflect the gap in 
constitutional imagination that contemporary constitutional theories of the founding moment 
help create.  
A. When Founding Moments Are Historical Facts Only: Disregard, 
Fidelity, and the Identity of Constitutional Theory 
A new constitutional order is mostly established in response to the failure of the existing 
regime.  The founding moment of a new constitution is thus a moment of crisis when the 
old constitutional order breaks down as a result of national liberation movement, civic 
uprising, military defeat, economic breakdown, or other precipitous events.12  Antipathy 
towards foreign or colonial regimes,13 resistance against repressive rulers,14 anger at failed 
war plans and strategic blunders,15 discontent with socioeconomic justice,16 and other 
socio-psychological responses are usually recorded in crises leading up to the founding of a 
new constitution.  To be sure, these reactions to the tumultuous situation in which a new 
constitutional order originates are not the only occurrences in the founding moment that are 
recorded.  The debates over how to respond to the failure of the old regime, the wrangling 
over the process and substance of the new constitutional order, and the tabulation of the votes 
cast in the convention or the referendum on the adoption of the new constitution are also part 
                                                
11 Examples include Rosenfeld (n 1) 42; Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a 
Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (William Rehg tr, MIT Press 1996).   
12 See Jon Elster, ‘Constitution-Making and Violence’ (2012) 4 Journal of Legal Analysis 8. 
13 See Ruth Gordon, ‘Growing Constitutions’ (1999) 1 U Pa J Const L 528. 
14 See eg Adam Roberts, ‘Civil Resistance and the Fate of the Arab Spring’ in Adam Roberts and others 
(eds), Civil Resistance in the Arab Spring: Triumphs and Disasters (OUP 2016) 270. 
15 See eg Yaprak Gürsoy ‘Civilian Support and Military Unity in the Outcome of Turkish and Greek 
Interventions’ (2009) 27 Journal of Political and Military Sociology 47, 59-60, 65. 
16  See eg Rehan Abeyratne, ‘Socioeconomic Rights in the Indian Constitution: Toward a Broader 
Conception of Legitimacy’ (2014) 39 Brooklyn J Int’l L 1. 
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of the historical record of the founding moment of a constitutional order.17  All of them are 
fact.  Thus, the accuracy of how they are documented and presented underlies the study of 
the founding moment as a matter of fact.   
Driven by the pursuit of historical truth and its accurate representation, scholars of the 
founding moment dig deeper and deeper into the details of its constitutive episodes.  On this 
view, the founding moment is a historical object to be faithfully represented.18  Yet, the 
accurate, specific, comprehensive representation of the founding moment does not tell us 
much about the relationship between the founding moment and its ensuing constitutional 
order.  Instead, it is a question of how the founding moment as a matter of fact is seen in the 
eyes of constitutional theory, raising the question of the identity of constitutional theory.   
The task of constitutional theory is to provide a language that gives expression to the 
political life under the constitution.19  To make sense of the constitutional order as a 
political project is what constitutional theory is all about.  Interpretation (vis-à-vis 
explanation) underpins the enterprise of making sense of the constitutional order. 20  
Noticeably, one defining character of contemporary constitutional theories is the fascination 
with the question of what norms in the constitutional ‘text’, which extends beyond the 
codified constitutional document, mean.21  This predilection for interpreting norms is not 
without reason especially in light of the new frontiers of constitutional scholarship.  Studies 
of constitutional orders have long extended beyond the exegesis of the constitution to issues 
about how constitutional norms are implemented, what explains the gap between precept and 
practice, to what extent the practice has displaced or amended the norms, etc.22  Yet, none 
of them can be addressed without confronting the question of what constitutional norms 
mean.  For example, the question of how constitutional norms are implemented is 
predicated on the cognizance of what to implement.  This obtains only when the radius of 
what constitutional norms stipulate has been determined through interpretation.  
Interpretation remains indispensable to constitutional studies that centre on the explanation of 
the gap between the law on the books and the law in action, too.  The reason is simple: If 
the law on the books is unknown, how can we even raise the question of why there is 
variance between it and the law in action?  What the law on the books stipulates only 
becomes clear as a result of interpretation.23   
                                                
17 See eg Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of the United States (Yale University Press 1913). 
18 This corresponds to ‘’descriptive representation’ developed in Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of 
Representation (University of California Press 1967) 60-91. 
19 Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (Princeton University Press 1988) 191-94.     
20 The role of interpretation in making sense of the constitutional order is further discussed in III.A. 
21 See Jed Rubenfeld, ‘The Paradigm-Case Method’ (2006) 115 Yale LJ 1977, 1977; Mark A Graber, A New 
Introduction to American Constitutionalism (OUP 2013) 3; Martin Loughlin, ‘The Constitutional Imagination’ 
(2015) 78 MLR 1, 14.  ‘Text’ here is understood in a broad sense and not restricted to constitutional provisions 
or judicial doctrines.  
22 See eg Ran Hirschl, Comparative Matters: The Renaissance of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP 
2014). 
23 See Ming-Sung Kuo, ‘A Dubious Montesquieuian Moment in Constitutional Scholarship: Reading the 
Empirical Turn in Comparative Constitutional Law in Light of William Twining and His Hero’ (2013) 4 
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I hasten to add that nothing I have said so far suggests that interpretation of 
constitutional norms is the only legitimate component or the most important characteristic of 
all theoretical studies of the constitution.  Instead, a quick survey of recent literature on 
constitutional scholarship will reveal that constitutional theory has extended beyond the 
matter of interpretation. 24   Nevertheless, the foregoing two examples indicate that 
interpretation of constitutional norms in the text constitutes the sine qua non of constitutional 
theory.25  When this interpretive core is revealed, the stance of contemporary constitutional 
theories towards the founding moment as a matter of fact also transpires. 
Considered fact, the founding moment is not necessarily integral to constitutional theory 
as the constitutional status of the founding moment depends on the theoretical position on the 
relationship between fact and constitutional interpretation. 26   To put it differently, 
contemporary constitutional theories oscillate between disregard and fidelity with respect to 
the historical founding moment.  To some, constitutional interpretation amounts to a 
function of the system of constitutional norms as exemplified in Hans Kelsen’s pure theory 
of law.  Under this view, there may be disagreement on whether the focus of emphasis 
should be on individual constitutional provisions or on the structural relationship between 
them.  Nevertheless, textualists and structuralists share the belief that they confine their 
determination of the meaning of constitutional norms within the normative system without 
taking fact into consideration.  To be clear, text and structure are not the only constituents of 
the system of constitutional norms.  Judicial interpretations of the constitution are also 
widely considered part of the normative system.27  Standing as historical event instead of 
legal precedent, however, the founding moment is to be disregarded by those who adopt an 
internal view of constitutional interpretation, regardless of whether they take a Kelsenian 
purist stance or not.28   
On the opposite end are those who take the view that fact is not only a component of 
interpretation.  Interpretation of constitutional norms cannot be legitimately rendered 
without receiving guidance from fact.  On this view, the founding moment as fact is 
indispensable to the exercise of constitutional interpretation as well as to the deciphering of 
the constitutional order in practice.  In contemporary constitutional theories, the foremost 
advocates for reading constitutional norms in light of the founding moment are those dubbed 
originalists. 29   Among the myriad facts of the founding moment they take into 
consideration, it is those pertaining to the adoption of constitutional provisions that interest 
                                                                                                                                                  
Transnational Legal Theory 487, 497-96. 
24 Hirschl (n 24). 
25 Martin Loughlin even goes further and observes that ‘[c]onstitutional scholarship is today driven by a 
desire to discover an authoritative method of constitutional interpretation’.  Loughlin (n 23) 14.   
26 cf Grégoire CN Webber, ‘Originalism’s Constitution’ in Grant Huscroft and Bradley W Miller (eds), The 
Challenge of Originalism: Theories of Constitutional Interpretation (CUP 2011) 147, 154. 
27 Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution: The Precedents and Principles We Live By (Basic 
Books 2012) ix-xiii. 
28 See also Frank I Michelman, ‘Constitutional Authorship’ in Larry Alexander (ed), Constitutionalism: 
Philosophical Foundations (CUP 1998) 64, 68-74. 
29 Rubenfeld (n 2) 63.  See also Lael K Weis, ‘What Comparativism Tells Us about Originalism’ (2013) 11 
ICON 842. 
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them most.  Or, to put it in a slightly exaggerated way, the whole historical record of the 
founding moment is examined only to determine the content of constitutional norms.30   
Notably, originalism is not the only way to take account of the historical facts of the 
founding moment in the interpretation of constitutional norms.31  Some constitutional 
scholars cast eyes beyond constitutional norms in their interpretation of the constitutional 
order.32  Even so, what theories in this strain of the historicist stance have in common is the 
view that the founding moment as historical fact provides the key to the status quo of the 
constitutional order and the guidance on the way forward.33  When the founding moment as 
historical fact is considered in the interpretation of constitutional norms, it is not only one of 
the many facts to be taken into account.  It is given a special status, standing out from other 
periods of time.  This backward-looking attitude results from the special interpretive 
character of constitutional theory.34   Framed within a progressive, linear temporality, 
constitutional interpretation cannot do away with the concept of authorship.35  Driven by the 
anthropomorphic characterization of the constitutional order, however, authorship becomes a 
conceptual framing of interpretation and is further perceived as the authenticity and primacy 
of the original intent of the attributed author of constitutional norms.36  As a result, the 
founding moment as a matter of fact is not only essential to the interpretation of 
constitutional norms.  The relationship between fact and interpretation becomes one of 
fidelity.  Originalists are just exemplary of those who hold the relationship between the 
historical founding moment and constitutional norms to be one of fidelity.37        
B. What If Founding Moments Resolve into Constitutional Norms: A 
Mere Matter of Interpretation 
While the founding moment comprises historical occurrences, it may or may not appear 
as fact in the eyes of constitutional theory.  Just as the Ackermanian constitutional moment 
                                                
30 Ackerman’s effort to identify ‘constitutional canons’ from the practices of constitutional moments is an 
example.  See Suzanna Sherry, ‘The Ghost of Liberalism Past’ (1992) 105 Harv L Rev 918, 933. 
31 Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (OUP 1982) 9-24. 
32  Ackerman’s constitutional theory suggests a broader notion of constitutional interpretation.  
Nevertheless, it remains focused on the deciphering of the normative imperatives of the existing constitutional 
order in light of historical occurrences in the preceding constitutional moments.  Bruce Ackerman, We the 
People, Volume 3: The Civil Rights Revolution (Belknap 1991) 7, 71.   
33 See also Weis (n 30) 846; Jack M Balkin, Living Originalism (Harvard University Press 2014). 
34 Paul W Kahn, The Cultural Study of Law: Reconstructing Legal Scholarship (University of Chicago Press 
1999) 43-49. 
35 Wilfrid J Waluchow, ‘Constitutional Interpretation’ in Andrei Marmor (ed), The Routledge Companions 
to Philosophy of Law (Routledge 2012) 417.  See also Sotirios A Barber and James E Fleming, Constitutional 
Interpretation: The Basic Questions (OUP 2007) 62-63. 
36  This is the originalist position, which Paul Kahn argues mistakes writership for authorship in 
constitutional interpretation.  See Kahn (n 2) 268-70; Paul W Kahn, Making the Case: The Art of the Judicial 
Opinion (Yale University Press 2016) 48-51. 
37 Notably, the requirement of fidelity in constitutional interpretation does not necessarily result in the 
Scalian style of originalism.  Balkin (n 33).  
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is more akin to conceptual construction than historical reality,38 the founding moment may 
stand as norm instead of fact to its ensuing constitution.  This is what I call the normativist 
view of the relationship between the founding moment and the constitutional order. 
As I have noted above, virtually all constitutional orders have their own historical 
founding moment.  In contrast to historicists, normativists regard the historical events, 
institutional innovations, prescriptive rules, or political actions at the founding moment as the 
embodiment of normative principles and values.39  What matters to constitutional theory is 
not that which actually happens at constitutional founding.  Instead, it is what lies beneath 
or behind these historical occurrences that interests constitutional theorists.  Through the 
normativist lens, reading the founding moment is not aimed at digging out some hidden 
historical fact about constitutional founding that may influence constitutional interpretation.  
Rather, the founding moment is explored in order to extract the fundamental values and 
normative principles from the historical episodes that take place at constitutional founding.40  
I emphasize that it is in the values and principles, not the episodes, that normativists are 
interested.  Reading the founding moment in this way is not so much the discovery of 
historical facts as the interpretation of constitutional norms.  Thus, studies of the founding 
moment become part of constitutional interpretation.  Both the founding moment and the 
constitutional order are turned into the objects of an integrated interpretive activity.41   
Once the fact that both the founding moment and the constitution are incorporated into 
one comprehensive interpretation of the constitutional order is laid bare, the role of the 
founding moment in constitutional interpretation naturally transpires.  As a matter of norm, 
the founding moment cannot be taken at face value but is rather to be viewed as the 
placeholder of the values and principles that have motivated the rejection of the old regime 
and further effected the institutional responses as embodied in the new constitution.42  Yet, 
with the translation of the principles and normative values at the founding moment into the 
underlying values and principles of positivized constitutional norms,43 the relationship 
between the founding moment and the resulting constitution is also fundamentally 
transformed under the normativist view.  What Jed Rubenfeld calls the ‘paradigm case 
interpretation’44 illustrates such a transformation.   
Under the paradigm case approach to constitutional interpretation, reading a 
constitutional provision in light of the particular issue its framers intended to tackle at the 
founding moment, which Rubenfeld calls the paradigm case, is aimed at correctly identifying 
                                                
38 See Ming-Sung Kuo, ‘Reconciling Constitutionalism with Power: Towards a Constitutional Nomos of 
Political Ordering’ (2010) 23 Ratio Juris 390, 399.   
39 Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (Harvard University 
Press 1996) 13.  
40 See generally Alan Gibson, Interpreting the Founding: Guide to the Enduring Debates over the Origins 
and Foundations of the American Republic (University Press of Kansas 2006).   
41 See Amar (n 29) 51-94. 
42 Rubenfeld (n 2) 183-88.  
43 By positivized constitutional norms, I mean the constitutional provisions in the Big-C constitution plus 
judicial doctrines that set out constitutional principles and rules. 
44 Rubenfeld (n 2) 178. 
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the purpose that is to guide its application to the case at hand.  The founding moment and its 
paradigm case are thus treated as the primary illustration of the legislative purpose.45  As 
reading the founding moment is pivoted to determining the purpose of positivized 
constitutional norms, the founding moment is absorbed into the post-founding constitutional 
order itself in that it resolves into the exercise of constitutional interpretation aimed at 
discovering the values and principles connoted by the purpose of constitutional norms. 
If my observation is correct, the question of the founding moment becomes a matter of 
the interpretation of constitutional norms through the lens of normativists.  As a result, the 
question of the founding moment seems to become part of the debate over interpretive 
methodology.  Viewed thus, the normativist view of the founding moment comes close to 
the historicist stance that maintains the founding moment commanding fidelity from the 
constitution as both reflect the variations on the method of constitutional interpretation.46  
Taken together, the significance of the founding moment to its ensuing constitutional order 
appears to be a function of stance-taking or methodological competition in the exercise of 
constitutional interpretation, regardless of whether it is considered fact or norm. 
C. Founding Moments Misconceived: Gap in Constitutional Imagination     
My discussion of the historicist and the normativist view of the founding moment 
shows that their contrasting stances resolve into different methods of interpretation.  Yet, 
this does not mean that the debate surrounding the founding moment is nothing more than a 
tempest in a teacup among constitutional scholars.  Rather, an investigation of how the 
inevitable imaginary of constitutional authorship is reflected in the historicist and the 
normativist stance’s towards the founding moment discloses a gap in constitutional 
imagination and the problem with contemporary constitutional theories.47   
As I have noted above, the historicists look to the founding moment as the source of 
fidelity because of its special status in the course of constitutional development.  It is 
regarded as the moment in which the constitutional order is authored, or rather brought into 
being.  On this view, constitutional authorship is reified in the historical founding moment 
and controlling, demanding fidelity from the future generations. 48   In contrast, the 
normativist stance towards the character of constitutional authorship is much less 
straightforward. 49   Through the normativist lens, the founding moment resolves into 
constitutional norms inasmuch as it is translated into normative purpose.  The nature of 
                                                
45 Ibid. 180-92. 
46 What Jack Balkin calls ‘framework originalism’ suggests that the distinction is not so rigid between 
historicist and the normativist stances.  See Balkin (n 35) 21-34.   
47  See Ming-Sung Kuo, ‘Cutting the Gordian Knot of Legitimacy Theory? An Anatomy of Frank 
Michelman’s Presentist Critique of Constitutional Authorship’. (2009) 7 ICON 683, 705-13.  For a discussion 
on constitutional imagination that centres on the epistemic (vis-à-vis popular) aspect, see Loughlin (n 23).  
48 See Balkin (n 11) 2.   
49 See also Alexander Somek, The Cosmopolitan Constitution (OUP 2014) 128-33.  
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purpose distinguishes normativists from fidelity-oriented historicists with respect to 
constitutional authorship.  It is noteworthy that normative purpose is different from the 
‘context’ of which interpretation of constitutional norms is supposed to take account: the 
former is fixed whereas the latter is changing in nature.50  I hasten to add that a fixed 
normative purpose does not necessarily lead to it being inflexible.  Quite the contrary: 
Unlike text, purpose is made abstract and general to accommodate changes in context.51  
With respect to the constitution, the purpose of positivized norms is fixed at constitutional 
founding but their application and the implications of the purpose to concrete cases can only 
be determined against the evolving context.  Thus, sublimated into purpose, the founding 
moment in the normativist strain is not as controlling as its rendering in the hands of the 
fidelity-oriented historicists, suggesting a constitutional authorship that is more abstract and 
open to the changing context in the future.52 
Yet, the normativist view pays a hefty price to keep the idea of constitutional authorship 
alive: the abstraction, if not deformation, of the founding moment.  As a result, the 
concreteness of the founding moment as conceived of by the fidelity-oriented historicists 
appears to be more accessible to the public than the abstract norms into which the founding 
moment is resolved under the normativist view.  More importantly, even though 
interpretation is never identical with that which is to be represented through interpretation, 
concreteness is more likely to be associated with the presence of authenticity.53  In the 
collective constitutional imagination that extends beyond specialists in constitutional 
interpretation, the constitutional order and its interpretation are seen as constantly seeking to 
approach the authenticity or identity of constitutional authorship.54  Specifically, in the eyes 
of non-specialists, the historical founding moment is real and the associated representation of 
constitutional authorship appears to be authentic.  All method-guided interpretations are 
expected to be able to speak to the identity of constitutional authorship at constitutional 
founding without fail.  Yet, to specialists (except those who totally disregard the historical 
founding moment), neither the historicist nor the normativist view of the founding moment 
can bring forth the much longed-for authenticity of authorship.  Whether the founding 
moment plays a controlling or an inspiring role in the constitutional order is a matter of 
interpretive method.  Regardless of being fact or norm, the founding moment as recounted 
in constitutional interpretation does not concern constitutional authorship.  This contrasting 
attitude towards the semblance of authenticity emanating from historical concreteness 
explains why originalism is not going away anytime soon.55    
  There is no blaming non-specialists for ignorance in mistaking a particular form of 
representation of the founding moment (originalism) for its authenticity (the presence of 
constitutional authorship).  Instead, here emerges a gap in constitutional imagination.  Not 
                                                
50 cf Rubenfeld (n 2) 181-83. 
51 ibid 188-91. 
52 ibid 187-88.  See also Kahn (n 38) 51-62.  
53 See Kahn (n 38) 126-34. 
54 See Paul W Kahn, The Reign of Law: Marbury v. Madison and the Construction of America (Yale 
University Press 1997) 177-229.  See also Larry Alexander, ‘Introduction’ in Alexander (ed) (n 30) 1, 1. 
55 Balkin (n???). 
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only failing to bridge the gap but widening it, contemporary constitutional theories are 
flawed in making sense of the founding moment in constitutionalism.  Reconceiving the 
role of the founding moment in the constitutional order will be the first step towards 
narrowing the gap.    
III. BETWEEN FACT AND NORM: IMAGINING FOUNDING 
MOMENTS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL NOMOS 
The gap between specialists and the public in constitutional imagination as noted above 
is not so much about the discrepancy between theory and practice as about the role of the 
founding moment in the constitutional order.  Whether through the historicist or the 
normativist lens, the founding moment is understood as centring on the articulation of norms 
and guiding principles implicit in the constitutional order, suggesting a unidirectional 
relationship between the founding moment and the constitutional order.    Regardless of 
disregard, fidelity, or absorption, the founding moment is either left out of the interpretation 
of the constitutional order (disregard), invoked to hold sway over the interpretation of 
constitutional norms (fidelity), or integrated into the norms as purpose (absorption).  
Moreover, such a unidirectional relationship is also ‘jurispathic’ as the founding moment 
plays no role in making sense of the ongoing operation of the whole constitutional order 
apart from settling individual disputes through interpretation, leading to the gap in 
constitutional imagination.  From this perspective, the fidelity-oriented historicist view does 
not hold out much hope for a less jurspathic relationship between the founding moment and 
the constitutional order either since its associated semblance of authenticity only rests on 
misconception.56        
Yet, this is not the only way that the founding moment may bear on the constitutional 
order.  Rather, the above unidirectional, jurispathic relationship can be turned genuinely 
relational and ‘jurisgenerative’ when the focus of constitutional theory shifts from 
constitutional interpretation to making sense of the constitutional order as a political project.  
To disclose what this relational view means to constitutional theory, I first draw upon 
Cover’s discussion of nomos and his view on the relationship between interpretation and 
meaning to lay the foundation for relating the founding moment to the constitutional order 
through narratives.  As this view bears significantly on the genesis of the constitutional 
order, I then discuss why the founding moment emerging from the relational view can shed 
new light on the concept of constituent power.  
 
                                                
56 See also Paul W Kahn, Finding Ourselves at the Movies: Philosophy for a New Generation (Columbia 
University Press 2013) 68. 
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A. Beyond Interpretation: Constitutionalizing Founding Moments 
through Narratives  
As I have suggested, constitutional theory is aimed at helping to make sense of the 
constitutional order as a political project.  Interpretation is never an end in itself but only 
part of the continuous collective effort to make sense of what it means by organizing the 
political life of a particular political community as a constitutional order.  As authenticity 
can never be exhausted by a particular interpretation,57 constitutional interpretation cannot 
be saved from the accusation that it is unauthentic for deviating from the constitution itself.58  
Yet, it is in the never-ending pursuit of authenticity that the meaning of the constitutional 
order is also enriched and revealed through interpretation.  In other words, making sense of 
the meaning of the political life under the constitutional order is embedded in the action 
taken in the quest for authenticity, namely, interpretation.59  Thus, persuasion is integral to 
the political action taken by individual citizens to approach authenticity through 
interpretation.60  In sum, the interpretive character of constitutional theory is only the 
surface manifestation of the unresolved but productive tension between interpretation and 
authenticity that makes persuasion necessary and keeps the meaning of the constitutional 
order alive.        
Seen in this light, interpretive settlement is provisional at best as it itself faces the 
question that it fails to represent the identity/authenticity of the constitution.61  And the 
pathology of contemporary constitutional theories lies in the fascination with a final 
interpretation through the correct method without keeping the meaning of the constitutional 
order in sight.  Worse still, constitutional interpretation has been commonly understood 
through the lens of ‘modalities’, becoming the game among specialists, if you will.62  Yet, 
Cover questioned such an attitude towards interpretation in the discovery of the meaning of 
the law, or rather, the constitutional order.  His critique of interpretation as understood in 
constitutional-legal practice suggests an alternative view of the role of the founding moment 
in the constitutional order.   
According to Cover, the common practice of legal interpretation that focuses on how to 
apply legal rules and other precepts to individual cases correctly is problematic for the 
discovery of the meaning in law.63  Of the practice of constitutional and legal interpretation, 
Cover observed that the official agent of interpreting the law (the judge in most cases) is 
                                                
57 cf Kahn (n 58) 41-45, 67-77.  
58 See Balkin (n 11) 103-38.  See also Kahn (n 38) 89-108. 
59 In other words, the constitutional order is more like performing art to be acted out than like literature text 
to be interpreted.  To be sure, the performer interprets a drama, for example, before and through his 
performance.  Balkin (n 11) 91-94.  
60 ibid. 12-13. 
61 This suggests an implicit form of accusing such interpretations of usurping the (constituted) amending 
power and thus defying the design by the constituent power.  William F Harris II, The Interpretable 
Constitution (The Johns Hopkins University Press 1993) 164-208.     
62 Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation (Blackwell 1991) 11-22. 
63 Cover (n 8) 6. 
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tasked with bringing finality and authoritativeness to the legal order of the modern state.64  
To achieve this goal, the agent backs up his interpretation of the legal order with discourse 
and force when necessary.65  Obviously, force is disruptive to the pursuit of constitutional 
meaning when it is invoked to put paid to the debate over the meaning of the constitutional 
precepts concerned in the public sphere.66  Besides, Cover further noted that facing the 
reality of legal pluralism, the judicial discourse is gravitated towards objectivity and 
universalism in the name of neutrality for fear of being seen as taking sides.  As a result, 
ethos and particulars pertaining to individual cases, which give meaning to legal precepts, are 
obscured in the interpretive gravitation towards objectivity and universalism.67  Modalities 
in theories of constitutional interpretation fail to come to grips with the root cause of this 
‘jurispathict’ character of the common practice of constitutional interpretation.68  Mistaking 
authority for persuasion, interpretive modalities do not help very much with the settlement of 
controversial constitutional issues.69    
Alternatively, Cover conceived of the law and the constitutional order as not only 
existing in but also envisaging a whole world, which Cover called a ‘nomos’.70  A nomos is 
the normative universe we inhabit.  Specifically, ‘[t]he rules and principles of justice, the 
formal institutions of the law, and the conventions of a social order are…but a small part of 
[such a] normative universe’.71  On this view, the meaning of the constitution is more the 
understanding of the whole constitutional order than the interpretation of individual 
constitutional norms, while the enterprise to discover the meaning of the constitution goes 
beyond the application of the methods of constitutional interpretation.72  To make sense of 
the legal institutions or prescriptions, Cover suggested, we need to relate them to ‘the 
narratives that locate [them] and give [them] meaning.’73  Situated in their discursive 
context, the legal institutions or prescriptions are no longer the commands of authorities but 
have their ‘history and destiny, beginning and end’.74  The purpose and meaning of legal 
institutions and prescriptions can only be fully grasped along with the underpinning 
narratives of the constitution order.  As Cover further observed, ‘[legal] prescription 
[cannot] escape its origin and its end in experience, in the narratives that are the trajectories 
plotted upon material reality by our imagination’.75  Given that the ‘material reality’ on 
which legal interpretation rests results from our imagination, history, literature, and other 
narratives also find their way into a normative universe.76  Law as a nomos comprises both 
legal rules and principles and their meaning-embedding narratives.     
                                                
64 ibid 16. 
65 ibid 9-10, 13.   
66 Robert M Cover, ‘Violence and the Word’ (1986) 95 Yale LJ 1601. 
67 See Cover (n 8) 13. 
68 See ibid 40. 
69 See Balkin (n 11) 12-16. 
70 Cover (n 8).  
71 ibid 4. 
72 Compare Harris (n 63) 114-63 with Bobbitt (n 64) 9-30. 
73 Cover (n 8) 4. 
74 ibid 5. 
75 ibid. 
76 ibid.  See also Harris (n 63) 103-13, 131-35. 
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The role of narratives in building a constitutional nomos figures prominently in the 
relationship between interpretation and the meaning in law as Cover conceived of.  
Appealing to the idea of commitment, Cover located ‘[t]he transformation of interpretation 
into [constitutional] meaning’ in the moment ‘when someone accepts the demands of 
interpretation and, through the personal act of commitment, affirms the position taken’.77  
This is more than consent to or acceptance of a particular rendering of the constitutional 
‘text’, whether it is written, oral, or social. 78   ‘Such affirmation entails a [unique] 
commitment to projecting the understanding of the norm at work in our reality through all 
possible worlds onto the teleological vision that the interpretation implies.’79  The creation 
of constitutional meaning thus requires ‘the objectification of that to which one is 
committed’.80  In Cover’s view, this can only be made possible by telling ‘a story of how 
[the constitution], now object, came to be, and more importantly, how it came to be one’s 
own’, namely, a narrative. 81   Narratives operate as the catalyst for persuasion by 
‘provid[ing] resource for justification, condemnation, and argument by actors within the 
group, who must struggle to live their [constitution]’.82  Moreover, by way of telling 
narratives in the process of persuasion, people of all political persuasions take part in the 
activity of constitutional (re)interpretation, turning the whole constitutional order into a 
jurisgenerative project (or simply jurisgenesis).83  It is also in this way that narratives relate 
the founding moment to the constitutional order and reshape their relationship.  
Through the lens of ‘Nomos and Narrative’, the constitutional order, which is the 
reification of the political project of citizens living as a community, turns out to be more than 
the combination of the documental constitution and its supporting institutions.  It is a nomos 
in which citizens take part in the constitutional project and jointly give meaning to it.  To 
put it differently, to be a constitutional nomos, the constitutional order needs to stand for 
what citizens aspire to and commit themselves to.  Notably, citizens find themselves in the 
constitutional order not only through their elected representatives or institutions and 
procedures but also through narratives concerning the birth and growth of the constitutional 
order.84  Either by entering into an individual dialogue with existing narratives about the 
constitutional order or by giving their own account of it, citizens partake of the construction 
of the constitutional nomos.  On this view, the meaning of the constitutional order cannot be 
identified with the interpretation of constitutional norms but rather materializes in the 
ongoing jurisgenesis in which ‘stories of peoplehood’ are told to carry out the constitutional 
project amid the tension between interpretation and authenticity.85  The genuine meaning of 
                                                
77 Cover (n 8) 45 (emphasis added).   
78 See Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (Basic Books 1973) 3-30. 
79 Cover (n 8) 45. 
80 ibid. 
81 See ibid.  See also Harris (n 63) 86-96. 
82 See Cover (n 8) 46. 
83 See ibid 15.   
84 See Balkin (n 11) 2-6; 25-32.  See also Paul W Kahn and Kiel Brennan-Marquez, ‘Statutes and 
Democratic Self-Authorship’ (2014) 56 Wm & Mary L Rev 115, 173-77. 
85  Balkin (n 11) 2; Rogers M Smith, Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political 
Membership (CUP 2003). 
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constitutional norms can only be fully grasped when they are read together with the 
narratives concerning their creation, contention, and evolution in the life of the whole 
constitutional order.  Thus, neither the normative purpose nor the underlying principles or 
values suffice to substantiate the meaning of constitutional norms as they are abstracted from 
the context in which the meaning is contained.  It is narratives that bring the meaning-rich 
context to the fore. 
Conceived of this way, the founding moment is related to the constitutional order not 
just as fact as the historicists claim or as norm as the normativists assert.  Rather, it is to be 
narrated in relation to the ongoing constitutional project with an eye to satisfying the longing 
for identity/ authenticity.  As noted above, the founding moment exists as historical 
occurrence in most cases.  Recognizing this fact does not necessarily result in commanding 
fidelity from the constitutional order as some historicists suggest.  Instead, the relationship 
between it and the resulting constitutional order is mediated by narratives.86  Narratives 
about the founding moment, or rather, the founding episodes, are told not to define 
constitutional norms or settle interpretative disputes.  Instead, they are invoked by citizens 
themselves to invite their fellow citizens living in the same constitutional order to come to 
terms with its genesis and reflect upon the constitutional project itself.  The flawed 
constitutional order as it is can find redemption by engaging with its own growth trajectory 
from birth through the flow of fresh narratives.87  For this reason, relating the founding 
moment to the ongoing constitutional order does not surrender the present generation’s 
political destiny to the dead hand of the founding fathers and mothers.  On the contrary, 
since the founding moment is related to the constitutional order through narratives, the 
constitutional nomos incorporates and reconstructs the founding moment by generating new 
narratives about the founding moment.  Under the relational view, reciprocity characterizes 
the relationship between the founding moment and its ensuing constitutional order.  Giving 
their own narratives, citizens of the here and now make decisions on the meaning of the life 
of the constitutional order after the founding moment but at the same time keep the 
constitutional project moving by engaging in constant persuasion as they take such decisions 
in anticipation of disagreement from their fellow citizens.88  As a result, the relationship 
between the founding moment and the constitutional order is genuinely relational.  It is no 
longer unidirectional as the stances of disregard, fidelity, and absorption connote. 
With intermediary narratives, the relational view is also set apart from the normativist 
stance.  Notably, narratives about the founding moment echo the normativist view of the 
founding moment as they are not aimed at re-enacting or remembering the birth of the 
constitutional order.  Rather, they are employed to bring the foundational values and 
principles to the fore so the constitutional nomos can thus continue on these normative pillars 
and evolve alongside the society without being overwhelmed by the vicissitudes of time and 
fortune.  Yet, narratives concern not only normative purpose or foundational values and 
                                                
86 Kahn (n 58) 27. 
87 Balkin (n 11) 119-23.  cf Kuo (n 49) 709-11. 
88 Kahn (n 58) 71-77. 
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principles.  A successful narrative must be coherent to be persuasive.89  It is conducted in a 
structure of unity filled with subjects, events, and conflicts.90  Narratives speak both to the 
political identity of citizens who find themselves in the constitutional nomos and to the 
identity of the constitutional order itself.91  Under the relational view, the founding moment 
is not only an attributed source of values or principles but also part of the quest for identity in 
the constitutional project. 
Situated in the discovery of the meaning of the constitutional order mediated by 
narratives, the question of the founding moment in constitutionalism is freed from the grip of 
specialists in constitutional interpretation.  As the founding moment is no longer related to 
the constitutional order only for the sake of the interpretation of constitutional norms, it 
cannot be mastered by methodology.  Rather, its meaning is intertwined with the whole 
constitutional order’s, which emerges from and evolves with refreshing narratives from 
citizens, not the monographs on interpretive methods or modalities from law professors.92  
Instead of leaving the question of the founding moment in constitutionalism in the hands of 
specialists, citizens relate the founding moment to the constitutional order on their own terms 
through the medium of narratives.  
Under the relational view, the founding moment is brought into contact with the 
constitutional order through narratives.  The founding moment sits between fact and norm 
instead of being characterized either as fact or as norm as the historicist and the normativist 
view suggest.  The question of the founding moment in constitutionalism raises 
fundamental issues concerning the meaning of the constitutional order beyond the 
interpretation of constitutional norms.  The constitutionalization of the founding moment by 
virtue of narratives suggests rethinking the constitutional order as a nomos at the core of 
which is the construction of identity.       
B. From Foundation to Invigoration: Founding Moments, Constitutions, 
and the Constituent Power  
In the beginning of this paper, I noted that the constituent power and the founding 
moment, both of which are the essentials of constitutional genesis, share some characteristics 
in constitutional theory.  One of them is that both stand at the interface of fact and norm.93  
Another concerns their relationship with the constitutional order.  As I have argued in the 
foregoing sections, narratives bring the founding moment into contact with the constitutional 
order in a way that suggests that it sits between fact and norm instead of being either fact or 
norm.  In terms of the close correspondence between the founding moment and the 
                                                
89 ibid 52-58.  cf Jacco Bomhoff, Balancing Constitutional Rights: The origins and Meanings of Postwar 
Legal Discourse (CUP 2013) 90-91. 
90 Kahn (n 38) 62-73, 83-87.   
91 See Balkin (n 11) 2-3. 
92 See Richard S Kay, ‘Constituent Authority’ (2011) 59 Am J Comp L 715, 756-57. 
93 Schmitt (n 1) 75-78, 125-35. 
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constituent power, what is the image of the constituent power entailed by the 
narratives-mediated constitutionalization of the founding moment?  To answer this 
question, a closer look at the relationship between the constituent power and the 
constitutional order will help. 
The constituent power and the constitutional order are conceptually distinct.94  The 
former gives birth to the latter while the latter only changes within the decisions made by the 
former.  As a corollary, another conceptual distinction is drawn between the constituent 
power and the constituted power.95  Viewed thus, the constituent power tends to be 
associated with action, free will, and freedom; the constituted power is part of the legal order 
underpinned by rules and other precepts.96  Acting on the constituted power is not an 
exercise of free will in full but instead a disciplined application of legal provisions concerned 
aimed at an ordered liberty.97  That said, the constituent power is not a kind of action to be 
taken lightly.  To the existing constitutional order, the constituent power means disruption, 
even destruction, in the sense that the latter is invoked to break free of the former’s grip.  
The constituent power can only engender a new beginning by putting the existing 
constitutional order to death.   
Due to its duality of freedom and destruction, the concept of constituent power is 
unsettling.  From the internal perspective of the constitutional order, it can only be 
remembered but should not be conceived.  It needs to be suppressed to keep the 
constitutional order going.  In contrast, when looked at from the external point of view, the 
constituent power is the symbol of freedom, the hope for liberation from the incorrigible 
existing regime, and the agency to bring about a pristine constitutional order.98  As a result, 
uneasiness usually looms over how to characterize incidents that disrupt the standing 
constitutional order.99  Should an instance of civil disobedience or rioting be seen as the 
sign of the resurrected constituent power?100  At what point of time can this characterization 
be legitimately determined?  Or, should disruptive acts of this sort instead be taken as 
lawbreaking behaviours that warrant punishment and even suppression?  How about a 
military coup d’état?101 
This is not the place for me to dwell on the various positions on the constituent power.  
Yet, the narratives-mediated constitutionalized founding moment as suggested above also 
                                                
94 Kuo (n 6) 399-400; Mark Tushnet, ‘Peasants with Pitch Forks, and Toilers with Twitter: Constitutional 
Revolutions and the Constituent Power’ (2015) 13 ICON 639, 645-46. 
95 Schmitt (n 1) 80, 128; Kuo (n 6) 399. 
96 See Kahn (n 58) 91-95.  See also Kahn (n 56) 97-99. 
97 See Kahn (n 56) 84-90 
98 Kahn (n 56) 97-99. 
99 Kuo (n 6) 395-98. 
100 Andreas Kalyvas, ‘Popular Sovereignty, Democracy and the Constituent Power’ (2005) 12 Constellations 
223, 230; Joel I Colón-Ríos, Weak Constitutionalism: Democratic Legitimacy and the Question of Constituent 
Power (Routledge 2012) 178-83.  See also Loughlin (n 10) 233-34. 
101 See Schmitt (n 1) 142; Tayyab Mahmud, ‘Jurisprudence of Successful Treason: Coup d’Etat and 
Common Law’ (1994) 27 Cornell Int’l LJ 49. 
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points to an alternative reading of the constituent power.102  I have noted that by way of 
narratives, the founding moment contributes to the constitutional nomos as it is not only 
associated with the foundational values and principles but also marks the beginning of the 
growth trajectory of the constitutional order.  Moreover, the founding moment that sets out 
the jurisgenerative constitutional project is also the time when the constituent power asserts 
itself.  Thus, narratives about the founding moment are stories about the invocation of the 
constituent power, too.  In this way, when the founding moment interfaces the constitutional 
order through narratives, the constituent power is also being narrated in relation to the 
jurisgenesis of the living constitutional nomos.     
What is important about the duality of narratives about the founding moment and the 
constituent power is that narratives are not told to remember the past and commemorate 
landmarks at constitutional genesis.  Rather, narratives themselves are constitutive of the 
constitutional nomos.  They substantiate the rules, norms, institutions, and other 
constitutional precepts with meaning that makes the constitutional order a nomos citizens 
inhabit.  Narratives about the genesis of the constitutional order also help with the 
reformation of the imperfect constitutional order by bringing the whole constitutional life 
into focus in the constant reflections on the state of the constitutional order.103  More 
importantly, narratives make the democratic pursuit of the meaning of the constitutional 
project possible.  In other words, constitutional genesis is not a mere past of the 
constitutional order.  It continues to work on the present constitutional project by way of 
narratives about it.  Thus, with narratives that bring the founding moment into contact with 
the ongoing constitutional order, the constituent power morphs from the generative force that 
brings forth the constitutional order into the rejuvenating energy that breathes new life into 
the constitutional project.  The constituent power not only brings the constitutional order 
into existence but also sustains the constitutional nomos by way of narratives about the 
founding moment. 104   In a word, the constituent power is reincarnated in the 
narratives-mediated constitutionalized founding moment. 
I hasten to add that the image of the constituent power emerging from the 
narratives-mediated constitutionalized founding moment does not suggest that the constituent 
power can or should be domesticated.  As a conceptual construct, the constituent power may 
come in many guises in reality.105  Nevertheless, the reincarnation of the constituent power 
in the narratives-mediated constitutionalized founding moment does point out a new 
temporal orientation of the constituent power.  From the internal perspective of the 
constitutional order, the conventional wisdom has it that the constituent power stays in the 
past or resurrects in the future only to end the present constitutional order.  On this view, the 
constituent power has no place in the present jurisgenerative process under the constitutional 
nomos.106  It is for this reason that scholars who take the external view of the constituent 
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power charge that the constitutional order is aimed at neutralizing the constituent power by 
co-opting it.107  Unless viewed from the external point of view and regardless of the 
disruptive effects it may entail, the constituent power is not oriented towards the present.108   
Yet, the reincarnation of the constituent power in the narratives-mediated 
constitutionalized founding moment means that the constituent power continuously bears on 
and reinvigorates the constitutional nomos through the narratives about the genesis of the 
constitutional order.  The constituent power as the symbol of freedom is no longer confined 
to the foundation of the constitutional order.  Rather, this alternative image of constituent 
power re-emerges in the invigoration of the constitutional project.  Beyond foundation and 
destruction, the constituent power that is reincarnated in the constitutionalized founding 
moment works towards the maintenance of the constitutional order.  Reincarnated in the 
narratives about the founding moment, the constituent power is not only remembered as a 
thing of the past but also relived in the present tense.      
IV. CONCLUSION 
Interpretation has dominated contemporary constitutional theories for too long.  
Studies of the founding moment either have been undertaken as part of the enterprise of 
constitutional interpretation organized along the divide between fact (fidelity) and norm 
(absorption) or have simply fallen outside the purview of constitutional theory (disregard).  
As a result, the formative role of the founding moment in the unfolding of the constitutional 
project has not yet received the attention it deserves.  This not only creates the gap in 
constitutional imagination between specialists and the public but is also symptomatic of the 
pathology of contemporary constitutional theories: The more sophisticated constitutional 
interpretation becomes, the more elusive the meaning of the constitutional order appears to 
the public.109         
Alternatively, I have proposed a relational approach to the constitutionalization of the 
founding moment, according to which the founding moment sits between fact and norm.  
The founding moment is related to the constitutional order by virtue of narratives that 
substantiate the constitutional order with meaning, rendering the constitutional project 
jurisgenerative.  The founding moment under the relational view proposed here can be 
further analysed in three aspects.  In terms of substance, constitutional theory will have to 
extend beyond the debate over interpretive methodology to ‘stories of peoplehood’.  Surely 
reframing the historical fact of the founding moment in constitutional terms through 
narratives is not just another restatement of constitutional theory on the role of history in the 
interpretation of constitutional norms.  Rather, the process of accounting for the founding 
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moment under the relational view recasts the understanding of the constitutional project in 
democratic terms.  The discovery of the meaning of the constitutional order is not 
constitutional experts’ privileged enterprise but rather requires the democratization of 
constitutional (re)interpretation.  Narratives epitomize the media via which the meaning of 
the constitutional project can be democratically discovered.  Through the narratives about 
the founding moment in the democratic pursuit of constitutional meaning, the constituent 
power can be brought to the fore in the present constitutional order without fearing its 
unsettling or destructive force 
Apart from substance and process, the structure of narratives about the founding 
moment is the pivot of the underlying constitutional imagination of the collective 
constitutional project that involves every member of the political community.  Narratives 
about the founding moment are part of the narratives about the growth trajectory of the 
constitutional order.  They must be told in a structure of unity to be coherent and thus 
persuasive.  This is not only an ethics of speaking constitutional language but also makes it 
possible for citizens to find themselves in the constitutional nomos.  To make sense of the 
constitutional order, constitutional theory needs to look beyond interpretation and take the 
quest for meaning and identity in the constitutional project seriously. 
